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Congress enacted the Electronic Communications Privacy Act to fill the
constitutional "gap" left by the Fourth Amendment's protection. In 2007, the Fourth
Amendment and the ECPA were at the forefront of news and debate. A seminal
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit decision, Warshak v. United
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
guarantees "[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons, houses
papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures."
1'
Memorialized by the United States Supreme Court as the "right to be
let alone," Americans widely consider the Fourth Amendment to be
both comprehensive and highly valued.2 This Amendment reflects the
Framers' recognition that certain aspects of an individual's life should
be free from government intrusion.3  While a person's home and
personal belongings are traditionally protected, whether an
individual's private electronic communications are entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection remains relatively undefined. Electronic
communications most notably include e-mail, but they can also include
other forms such as text messaging.4  For Fourth Amendment
purposes, electronic communications can be considered modem-day
"papers and effects."5
Recent government searches and seizures of privately held
electronic communications and files have made national headlines and
have spawned international debate. Notably, as the War Against
Terror progressed, the Bush Administration sought to protect the
United States from future terrorist attacks when it authorized the
Terrorist Surveillance Program ("TSP").6 This National Security
Agency ("NSA") program monitored telephone calls and Internet
communications between the United States and other countries without
1 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting), overruled by
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
3 Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178 (1984).
4 See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 1204, 1209 (C.D. Cal.
2004).
5 Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical
Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1557,
1586 (2004); see Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 834 (E.D. Pa. 1996),
aft'd521 U.S. 884 (1997).
6 Letter from Alberto Gonzales, Att'y Gen., to Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Judiciary Comm.,
(Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://news.findlaw.com/cnn/docs/doj/ag11707fisaltr.html
[hereinafter Letter from Alberto Gonzales].
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obtaining search warrants; the United States believed its policy was
both right and justified because someone on either side of the phone
was believed to be linked to al Qaeda.7
However, in August 2006, a federal district court in Michigan held
that the TSP violated the Fourth Amendment and was, therefore,
unconstitutional.8  Five months later, in January 2007, then-Attorney
General Alberto Gonzales announced that the warrantless TSP had
been placed under the review of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court ("FISC"), a court that specializes in wiretap requests.9 Under
this new jurisdiction, the government is able to target international
communications after a FISC judge issues an order based on the
finding that "there is probable cause to believe that one of the
communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated
terrorist organization.'
10
Fourth Amendment issues arose in 2007 in popular American
sports culture as the government engaged in arguably warrantless
searches of private electronic files. Federal authorities investigated the
use of performance-enhancing drugs by Major League Baseball
("MLB") players, which began shortly after team owners called for
confidential testing following congressional hearings whereby several
high-profile MLB players denied such use." The existence of the test
results enabled federal investigators to obtain a search warrant to
search the files of ten named players at the participating drug testing
laboratories. During the search, federal agents seized paper and
electronic data related to those ten players subject to the warrant, but
also obtained intermingled incriminating data of 104 other MLB
7 Dan Eggen, Court Will Oversee Wiretap Program, WASH. POST, Jan. 18, 2007, at Al,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/01/17/
AR2007011701256.html.
8 Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D. Mich.
2006); see also United States v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the E. Dist. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297 (1972)
(holding that prior judicial approval was required for certain types of domestic security
electronic surveillance).
9 See Letter from Alberto Gonzales, supra note 6; see also Eggen, supra note 7.
1o Letterfrom Alberto Gonzales, supra note 6.
" Adam Thompson, Is Baseball Drugs Ruling a Fourth-Amendment Foul?, WALL ST. J., Jan.
16, 2007, http://online.wsj.com/public/articleprint/SB 116891199049077225-
9alpzT2nNQfzmdX9Jr3KIfn8sO_20070214.html.
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players not specified in the warrant. 12 The data seized included the
results from 1,438 tests from 2003, as well as medical records of
participants in "13 other 'major sports organizations,' three
unaffiliated businesses and three sports competitions."'' 3
The search calls into question "how much freedom the government
has to pursue crimes discovered in electronic files while searching for
evidence against other people."'14 In December 2006, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ("Ninth Circuit") held that the
government's search and seizure of the computer files did not violate
the unnamed MLB players' constitutional rights. The Court found that
the government respected the players' privacy when it acted pursuant
to a warrant to investigate the ten named players' illegal steroid use
while simultaneously seizing paper and electronic data of those players
not listed in the warrant.' 5
As these controversies demonstrate, the right to privacy in
electronic communications and files is of widespread interest and of
profound importance. Part II of this note considers the Fourth
Amendment's protection regarding the search and seizure of physical
and virtual personal effects. By examining current constitutional
jurisprudence, this note seeks to extrapolate the limits of Fourth
Amendment protection with respect to electronic communications.
Part III discusses the statutory protection of electronic
communications, which was intended to compensate for the narrow
interpretation accorded to the Fourth Amendment in circumstances
where the communication is revealed to a third party. Part IV of this
note provides in-depth analysis of the seminal 2007 United States
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ("Sixth Circuit") decision
regarding electronic privacy, Warshak v. United States,'6 which
squarely confronted unaddressed Fourth Amendment and Electronic
Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") issues.
12 Id; see also Bob Egelko, 100 Big-Leaguers Steroid-Positive in 2003 Season; Court Rules
Federal Prosecutors Can Use Tests for Investigation, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 28, 2006, at B 1,
available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f--/c/a/2006/12/28/
BAGL8N95J51 .DTL.
13 Egelko, supra note 12; United States v. Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 473 F.3d 915,
932 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Thompson, supra note 11.
14 Thompson, supra note 11.
Is Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 473 F.3d at 938.
16 Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007).
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1I. FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTION
OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
A. FOURTH AMENDMENT LEGAL DOCTRINE
The United States Supreme Court has yet to determine whether,
and to what extent, the Fourth Amendment protects electronic
communications. As a result, lower courts and scholars alike continue
to rely on a series of Supreme Court decisions from the 1960s in an
attempt to extrapolate the modem scope of the Fourth Amendment's
protection. In Katz v. United States, the most notable of the 1960s
surveillance cases, the Supreme Court abandoned the traditional
Fourth Amendment property-based analysis, which guarded against
physical intrusion into a protected area, and held that the Fourth
Amendment may be invoked when a person has a "reasonable
expectation of privacy.'' 17 To determine whether a "reasonable
expectation" exists, a court must answer two seemingly basic
questions: first, does the individual exhibit a subjective expectation of
privacy; and second, is society prepared to recognize that person's
subjective expectation as reasonable?' 8  Together, the two 9prongs of
the "reasonable expectation of privacy" ("REP") test' seek to
determine whether the government's intrusion violates personal and
societal values.
20
To determine whether an intrusion is constitutional, analysis
centers on the reasonableness of the individual's expectation of
privacy. A person may invoke the Fourth Amendment's protection
when she claims a "'justifiable,' a 'reasonable' or a 'legitimate
17 Katz, 389 U.S. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring); compare Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth
Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102
MICH. L. REv. 801 (2004) (explaining that property-based analysis has endured when it has
aided government surveillance) with Peter P. Swire, Correspondence: Katz is Dead. Long Live
Katz., 102 MICH. L. REV. 904 (2004) (demonstrating that the abandonment of property-based
analysis has aided government surveillance).
" Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
19 Patricia L. Bellia, The Fourth Amendment and Emerging Communications Technologies,
IEEE SEC. & PRIVACY, May/June 2006, at 20-28, available at
http://www.computer.org/portal/site/security/menuitem.6f7b241455 1cb84651286b 1 08bcd45f3
/index.jsp?&pName=securitylevell article&TheCat= 1015&path=security/2006/v4n3&file=b
ellia.xml&jsessionid=F37dpqwQSpyG2mPRhqLZVZm4yYnTDs1vhhhT9zkdPY69.9RVMB
yv!-1 146783785.
2 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 182-83.
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expectation of privacy ' '2' and her assertion is validated when it is in
accord with society's expectation. 22 When making this constitutional23
determination, no single factor controls, but the Supreme Court has
considered such factors as the Framers' intent,24 the ground upon
which the search was conducted,25 societal understandings 26 and the
individual's use of the thing seized.27 Under this framework, "[a]
'search' occurs when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared
to consider reasonable is infringed. A 'seizure' of property occurs
when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's
possessory interest in that property."
28
With respect to electronic communications, the reasonableness of
one's privacy expectation also turns on whether the item seized or
intercepted is properly considered identification information or content
information. Known also as "envelope information," identification
information is normally found on the outside of a letter and no privacy
expectation attaches because the postal service must view it in the
course of delivery.29  Similarly, envelope information regarding
21 Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
22 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 149 (1925); but cf Susan Freiwald, First Principles
of Communications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3 (2007) (arguing that the reasonable
expectation of privacy test is "unwieldy and misguided" when applied to modem electronic
communications) and Stephen E. Henderson, Beyond the (Current) Fourth Amendment:
Protecting Third-Party Information, Third Parties, and the Rest of Us Too, 34 PEPP. L. REv.
975 (2007) (arguing that the reasonable expectation of privacy test is "wrongheaded" when
applied to third parties).
23 Oliver, 466 U.S. at 177.
24 Id. at 178 (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977)) (recognizing that the
Framers' primary intention was to protect against home intrusion while acknowledging that
the Fourth Amendment provides more expansive protections).
2 5 Id. (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960)) (considering whether an
affidavit based on information from an informant was sufficient to establish probable cause for
a search warrant but ultimately holding it was not because the affiant did not set forth any
personal observations but rather rested wholly on hearsay).
26 Id. (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 (1980)) (societal understanding is
examined in order to consider what the Framers might have thought was reasonable).
27 Mulligan, supra note 5, at 1585.
28 United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984).
29 Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law after the USA Patriot Act: The Big Brother That
Isn't, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 607, 628 (2003).
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electronic communications entails an e-mail's "to" and "from" fields,
for which no expectation of privacy exists.30 But unlike the content of
a sealed letter, which is protected by the Fourth Amendment, "courts
have struggled to apply the Fourth Amendment to content sent over
communications networks . . . because the content of Internet
communications is mixed together with envelope information and
disclosed to the ISP.' 1 Therefore, while it seems as though one's
privacy expectation in the content of an e-mail is reasonable, society
may not be prepared to recognize this expectation due to the manner in
which e-mail is currently transmitted.
B. THE NARROWING OF FOURTH AMENDMENT DOCTRINE SINCE KATZ
The REP test enhances an individual's Fourth Amendment
protection by expanding the scope of judicial analysis beyond a strictly
property-based search and seizure; however, subsequent Supreme
Court decisions have narrowed its breadth. Specifically, the "business
records cases" 32 curtailed the reach of the REP test by collectively
establishing the third party doctrine; that is, these cases held that some
types of information failed to satisfy the subjective portion of the test
because the individual voluntarily revealed the information to a third
party.
33
Each individual in the business records cases disclosed his
personal information to a common private entity including a bank,34 an
accountant 35 and a telephone company,36 and each maintained a
subjective expectation that his information would not be shared.
However, the courts determined that, in light of the surrounding
circumstances, such expectations were unreasonable. Today, the third
party doctrine significantly narrows courts' interpretation of the REP
30 Id.
31 Id. at 628-29.
32 See Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Cal. Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21
(1974); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976); Smith, 442 U.S. at 735 [hereinafter
Business Records Cases].
33 Mulligan, supra note 5, at 1578.
34 Cal. Bankers Assn., 416 U.S. at 21; Miller, 425 U.S. at 435.
35 Couch, 409 U.S. at 322.
36 Smith, 442 U.S. at 735.
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test, which results in significantly more document searches than would
otherwise occur under a moderate or expansive interpretation. 37
Recognizing this, Professor Peter Swire has commented that the REP
test "has become a sword for the government, not a shield of personal
privacy.
3s
Although the REP test may limit Fourth Amendment protection in
some instances, this test serves as a secondary limitation to the initial
hurdle of characterizing the intruding actor. The constitutional
boundaries of Internet privacy only limit government intrusion and do
not restrict private individuals or entities. Therefore, a private entity's
search and seizure of a user's personal e-mail is wholly outside the
scope of the Fourth Amendment. Distinguishing between public and
private actors, therefore, serves as an even greater limitation than the
REP test.
39
Despite the dearth of Supreme Court guidance, lower court
authority is emerging regarding the scope of Fourth Amendment
protection accorded to electronic communications. When making this
determination, courts examine the reasonableness of the government
intrusion in lipht of the particular facts and circumstances as they exist
at that time. Distinct from penetrating the home or seizing physical
documents, government intrusion into technology-based effects may
occur in one of three ways: the government may acquire electronic
communications (1) in transmission; (2) in storage held by an Internet
Service Provider ("ISP"); or (3) the government may acquire the
transactional data linked with transmission or storage of the electronic
communication, such as "source or destination information associated
with a particular communication" like one's telephone number, e-mail
message or IP address.
4 1
Electronic communications in transmission may be entitled to the
same Fourth Amendment protection as voice communications. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces has
acknowledged, "the transmitter of an e-mail message enjoys a
37 Swire, supra note 17, at 907.
3 1d. at 910.
39 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 133 (White, J., concurring); see also Shawn C. Helms, Translating
Privacy Values with Technology, 7 B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. L. 288, 306 (2001) (acknowledging
that "constitutional arguments effectively address only half the problem").
40 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 115.
41 Bellia, supra note 19.
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reasonable expectation that police officials will not intercept the
transmission without probable cause and a search warrant."42
As to whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of
privacy in one's stored electronic communication, United States v.
Miller suggests that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists
because the subscriber has surrendered any Fourth Amendment
protection by voluntarily conveying her communications to a third
party, namely her ISP.4 However, a three-judge panel for the Sixth
Circuit held otherwise in Warshak v. United States.44 There, the Court
held that the plaintiff maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his stored e-mails because the ISP did not access this information in
the ordinary course of its business.
45
Finally, regarding transactional data, Supreme Court decisions
indirectly suggest that an individual is least likely to have a reasonable
expectation of privacy in her envelope information because
intermediaries along the way view it in order to transmit the
communication to its intended destination.
46
Today, many ISP subscribers are likely to subjectively expect that
their electronic communications will remain private. Despite the
likelihood of satisfying the first, subjective prong of the REP test,
there are three main arguments against society's recognition of
electronic communication privacy. If persuasive, any one of these
arguments would cause the REP test's second prong to fail.
First, once the sender transmits a message, arguably, the user
relinquishes control over the recipient's handling of it.4 7 The sender's
42 United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406,418 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
43 Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law through Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1375, 1402 (2004); Miller, 425 U.S. at 442; see United States v. Kennedy, 81 F. Supp. 2d
1103, 1110 (D. Kan. 2000); United States v. Hambrick, No. 99-4793, 2000 WL 1062039 (4th
Cir. 2000); United States v. Cox, 190 F. Supp. 2d 330 (N.D.N.Y. 2002).
44 Warshak, 490 F.3d 455.
41 Id. at 473-74.
46 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443 ("The depositor takes the risk, in revealing his affairs to another,
that the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government."); Smith, 442 U.S. at
743-44; Couch, 409 U.S. at 335; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966); but cf.
Bellia, supra note 19 (arguing that Web communications reveal not only locations but also
"give significant clues about th[e] file," including content that is protected under the Fourth
Amendment).
47 See Business Records Cases; see also Bellia, supra note 43, at 1386.
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reasonable expectation of privacy is lost at the moment the recipient
opens the electronic communication.48 While the sender who forwards
an e-mail to others may have a reasonable expectation of privacy upon
transmission, this expectation vanishes upon receipt because the
sender cannot control what the recipient chooses to do with it. The
message may be forwarded on the recipient's whim without regard for
the sender's privacy expectations. Likewise, communications made in
chat rooms to the public-at-large "lose any semblance of privacy ' '49 as
do messages posted on electronic bulletin boards 0 for the same
reason. Additionally, a person who voluntarily provides information
to a third party via peer-to-peer networking5 r lacks any reasonable
expectation of privacy because she has "essentially open[ed] the
computer to the world. ' 2
Second, society cannot recognize an individual sender's right to
privacy because the sender relies on several third parties to transmit
the message to the recipient.53  By transmitting the electronic
communication through intermediaries, the sender's original
expectation of privacy is frustrated. 4  The Fourth Amendment's
protection can only be invoked for an undisturbed expectation of
privacy; once frustration occurs via voluntary disclosure to a third
party, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit governmental seizure
of the non-private information.
55
48 Mulligan, supra note 5, at 1590.
41 See Maxwell, 45 M.J. at 419; United States v. Charbonneau, 979 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D. Ohio
1997); State v. Evers, 815 A.2d 432 (N.J. 2003).
50 Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2007).
5 1 DENNIS NICEWANDER, 17TH CIR., FLA., FOURTH AMENDMENT ASPECTS OF INTERNET
COMMUNICATIONS AND TECHNOLOGY, http://www.locatethelaw.org/Searches/PDF/
Expectations.pdf ("Peer-to-peer typically refers to file sharing programs... and once you find
a desired file on the network, a direct connection is established between you and the possessor
of the file and the file is transferred directly to your computer.").
52 Recording Indus. Assn. of Am. v. Verizon Internet Serv., 257 F. Supp. 2d 244,267 (D.C.
2003).
53 Bellia, supra note 43, at 1385-86.
54 See Miller, 425 U.S. at 443; see, e.g., Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 114-19.
55 Jacobsen, 466 U.S. at 117. (A package containing cocaine was shipped to the defendants by
a private carrier and was damaged in transit. The carrier opened it and called federal agents
who took a small sample, without a warrant, for testing. The Supreme Court held that the
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Third, society may be uncomfortable recognizing an individual's
right to privacy because it is warned of the omnipresent threat of the
Internet's vulnerability to attack.5 6 Or, society may be uncomfortable
because the general public regularly uses devices that diminish one's
privacy. For example, helicopters and airplanes permit overhead
surveillance of one's private property but the general public flies
regularly despite this blatant invasion of privacy. 57
III. STATUTORY GAP-FILLING: THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
OF THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT
Based on the Supreme Court's precedent in the business records
cases, Congress enacted legislation piecemeal to prohibit private
individuals from infringing upon others' privacy rights.58 The need for
this legislation arose from two primary forces. First, law enforcement
needed clearly defined standards regarding whether, and to what
extent, electronic communications were protected against intrusion.59
Second, technology had progressed to the point where "the contents of
a communication could be accessed at multiple points in time, from
multiple parties, and at multiple locations. Congress finally
sealed package was an effect to which a person has a legitimate expectation of privacy;
however, when an agent of a private freight carrier frustrated the individual's privacy
expectation by opening the package himself and turning it over to government officials, a
warrant was not required.).
56 Bellia, supra note 43, at 1386.
57 Compare Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001) (holding that a thermal-imaging
device used by a police detective to investigate whether the petitioner was growing marijuana
inside his house violated the petitioner's Fourth Amendment right because the sense-
enhancing technology was not "in general public use") with California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S.
207, 214-15 (1986) (holding an aerial inspection by police via airplane did not violate thedefendant's Fourth Amendment right because the defendant had overtly cultivated marijuana
in his backyard) andFlorida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448-50 (1989) (holding that an aerial
inspection by police via helicopter did not violate the defendant's Fourth Amendment right
because the defendant's marijuana cultivation was plainly visible through missing roof panels
on his greenhouse).
58 Paige Norian, Comment, The Struggle to Keep Personal Data Personal: Attempts to Reform
Online Privacy and How Congress Should Respond, 52 CATH. U. L. REv. 803, 811 (2003).
59 Mulligan, supra note 5, at 1563.
"Id at 1558.
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delineated the scope of electronic privacy rights when it adopted the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") of 1986.61
The ECPA is arguably expansive in two respects. First, the ECPA
protects an individual's privacy interest in electronic communications,
storage and transactions. 62  Second, the ECPA protects individuals
from government, individual and third-party intrusion. As one
component of the ECPA, Congress statutorily defined the scope of
one's reasonable expectation of privacy in stored electronic
communications when it passed the Stored Communications Act of
1986 ("SCA").64
Congress enacted the SCA for three main reasons: (1) it was
uncertain whether an individual could retain a reasonable expectation
of privacy with regard to information sent to ISPs; (2) a subpoena
compelling an ISP to disclose certain sought-after information did not
require probable cause; and (3) most ISPs are private entities and are
able to search through stored files, that is, the Fourth Amendment
prohibits neither the search nor subsequent disclosure.
65
Although the ECPA and the SCA filled in some Fourth
Amendment gaps, the SCA also permitted varying degrees of
departure from the procedural stringency imposed by the Fourth
Amendment. Whereas the Fourth Amendment prohibits government
intrusion unless there is probable cause, the SCA identifies a range of
circumstances in which law enforcement officials are authorized to
access electronic communications by satisfying a lower standard.66
Specifically, the SCA distinguishes between three types of
communications that affected the government's ability to compel
disclosure. 67 First, § 2703 of the SCA mandates that the government
entity obtain a search warrant before obtaining communications held
"in electronic storage" with an electronic communication service
61 Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848
(codified as amendment in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
62 Mulligan, supra note 5, at 1564.
63 Elbert Lin, Note, Prioritizing Privacy: A Constitutional Response to the Internet, 17
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1113 (2002).
64 Stored Communications Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711(2000).
65 Mulligan, supra note 5, 1569-70.
66 §§ 2701-09, 2711-12 (2000); Bellia, supra note 43, at 1413.
67 See § 2703.
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("ECS") provider for 180 days or less.68 This section is the most
stringent because government officials must demonstrate probable
cause before a judge can issue a warrant. 69 When the government
obtains a warrant, notice need not be given to the individual whose
electronic communications are being searched.7 °
Second, § 2703 of the SCA enables the government to require a
remote computing service ("RCS") provider to provide electronic
storaqe content existing for longer than 180 days in one of three
ways 1: (1) law enforcement may obtain a search warrant compellin
the RCS to disclose the information without notifying the subscriber
7 ;
(2) investigators may compel a third-party ISP to produce the
communications via subpoena, although the government must notify
the subscriber that her ISP has been subpoenaed 73; and (3) if the
government is able to evince "specific and articulable facts showing
that there are reasonable grounds to believe" that the information
sought to be compelled is "relevant and material to an ongoing
criminal investigation," then a § 2703 court order may be issued, but
like the process attached to the subpoena, the subscriber must be
notified of such disclosure. 74 As a basic rule of thumb, the longer the
electronic communication is in existence, the more the substantive
legal protection against government access relaxes. 75
IV. WARSHAK V. UNITED STATES: USHERING IN A NEW ERA
OF ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PROTECTION?
The SCA is complicated and often interpreted in contradictory
ways. For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
68 § 2703(a).
69 Bellia, supra note 19.
70 Mulligan, supra note 5, at 1570.
71 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)-(b) (2000); see Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored
Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1208,
1218-19 (2004).
72 § 2703(b)(1)(A).
13 § 2703(b)(1)(B).
74 § 2703(b)(1)(B)(ii) (citing §2703(d)).
75 Mulligan, supra note 5, at 1570.
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Circuit held that an e-mail message that had been received was in
electronic storage with an RCS; thus post-transmission retrieval did
not violate the SCA.76  However, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit reached the opposite result.77  Similarly, the
retrieval of text messages stored for back-up protection purposes was
not found to violate the SCA.78 As these examples demonstrate, the
interpretation of the SCA is much like that of the Fourth Amendment-
the spectrum of judicial interpretation with regard to changing
technologies varies dramatically.
Both the Fourth Amendment and the SCA were scrutinized in 2007
and a groundbreaking result was reached when one Circuit defied
widespread understanding. In June 2007, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit single-handedly rewrote the law of
Internet privacy7 9 by relaxing the third party doctrine when it handed
down Warshak v. United States.8 0 The opinion largely rests on the
notion that e-mail is an "ever-increasing mode of private
communication, and protecting shared communications through this
medium is as important to the Fourth Amendment principles today as
protecting telephone conversations has been in the past."8' Privacy
advocates viewed this decision as a major victory, because it became
the controlling law in the Court's jurisdiction for a period of time and
because other federal jurisdictions would likely look to it for
guidance.82
In Warshak, the United States was engaged in a criminal
investigation of the plaintiff, Steve Warshak, for mail and wire fraud,
money laundering and other related offenses in connection with his
small business.83 In 2005, a United States Magistrate Judge issued an
76 Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 635 (E.D. Pa. 2001), aff'd, 352
F.3d 107, 113-14 (3d Cir. 2003).
77 Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 341 F.3d 978, 985 (9th Cir. 2003).
78 Quon, 309 F. Supp. 2d at 1209.
79 Posting by Orin Kerr to Volokh Conspiracy blog,
http://volokh.com/posts/1182271994.shtml (June 21, 2007, 03:36 EST).
s Warshak, 490 F.3d 455.
81 Id. at 473.
82 The Sixth Circuit's jurisdiction includes Ohio, Michigan, Tennessee and Kentucky.
83 Warshak, 490 F.3d at 460.
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order under SCA § 2703 that required Warshak's ISPs, NuVox
Communications, and Yahoo! to turn over information pertaining to
his e-mail accounts, including his subscriber information, the contents
of communications older than 180 days, and log files and backup
tapes.84 The order was issued under seal and disclosure to Warshak
was delayed until ninety days after it occurred.85 One year later, the
government notified Warshak of both orders.
Warshak filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. He
alleged that "the compelled disclosure of his e-mails without a warrant
violated the Fourth Amendment."8 6 When the government refused to
assure Warshak that it would not seek additional SCA orders, Warshak
moved for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
injunction.8 7
The United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
found that the government violated Warshak's Fourth Amendment
rights when it failed to obtain a search warrant based on a showing of
probable cause.88 It reasoned that e-mails held by an ISP were
analogous to sealed letters held by the post-office and in both
instances, the sender maintained an expectation of privacy.8 9 Based on
the merits of Warshak's constitutional claim, the district court deemed
it unnecessary to reach his SCA claim.90 The district court found that
Warshak did not meet the facial challenge burden by demonstrating
that the government seized his e-mails on a showing of less than
probable cause.91 Rather, the court was troubled by the government's
ex parte authorization. Under these circumstances, the court was only
willing to say that the constitutional flaws of the SCA were "facial in
nature" and granted an order preliminarily enjoining all seizures of e-
84 Id.
85 id.
861 Id. at 462.
87Id. at 461.
88 Warshak v. United States, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 50076, *20 (S.D. Ohio 2006).
89 Warshak, 490 F.3d at 461.
90 Id.
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mail in the court's jurisdiction unless notice and a hearing were
administered.
92
The United States appealed and made four substantive arguments.
First, the United States argued that Warshak lacked standing to
challenge future searches under the SCA because his claims were
hypothetical and failed to show imminent harm.93 Second, it argued
that Warshak's claims were not ripe because he challenged future
government seizures of his e-mails that were uncertain to occur.
94
Third, the United States argued that the Fourth Amendment's probable
cause standard was inapplicable in the context of SCA seizures. 95 The
government contended that a § 2703 court order was not a "search"
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but rather, was a
compelled disclosure, akin to a subpoena. 96 Fourth, it argued that
Warshak's claim was not the proper subject of a facial challenge to
§ 2703 of the SCA. As a result, the Sixth Circuit was faced directly
with the question of "whether an e-mail user maintains a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his e-mails vis-A-vis the Party who is subject
to compelled disclosure-in this instance, the ISPs.
'97
The Sixth Circuit first concluded that Warshak had standing to
challenge future searches pursuant to the SCA because the government
had seized his e-mails in the past and he was still under investigation.
Warshak's claim was not hypothetical because the government had a
policy of seizing e-mails without a warrant or notice to the account
holder, and, in Warshak's case it refused to guarantee that it would
abstain from future seizures. 9  Thus, Warshak was subject to
imminent constitutional harm.
Warshak's claim was also ripe for adjudication, the Sixth Circuit
found, because there was a substantial likelihood that the
unconstitutional conduct he sought to enjoin would occur again in the
future. Simply put, the government's ex parte approach eliminated a
92 Id. at 462.
93 d. at 465.
94 Id. at 467.
95 d. at 464.
96 Id. at 468.
97 Id. at 469.
9' Id. at 467.
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more appropriate time for judicial review. If the Court deemed his
claim unripe then Warshak would have suffered continuing Fourth
Amendment violations.
99
After disposing of the government's procedural arguments, the
Sixth Circuit responded to the substantive challenges. The Court held
that a person maintains a reasonable expectation of privacy in one's e-
mails and, as a result, the government was required to meet the Fourth
Amendment's probable cause standard before it could require ISP
disclosure.l10 In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit focused on
two narrow questions to distinguish situations where information is
shared with third parties and the person maintains a reasonable
expectation of privacy from those situations where the third party
doctrine applies and the individual's expectation is unreasonable. The
Court first assessed with whom the information was shared compared
to who was excluded, and second, whether the information shared was
identification information or content information.' 0 '
When examining with whom Warshak's e-mails were shared, the
Sixth Circuit analogized an individual's privacy interest in the content
of an e-mail to one's privacy interest in the content of a telephone call,
as recognized in Katz and Berger.10 2 The Court refrained from making
a broad assertion with regard to the third party doctrine in the context
of e-mails and instead stated that the sharing of information does not
"entirely erode" all reasonable expectations of privacy.0 3 First, the
Sixth Circuit reasoned that although a third party intermediary, such as
an ISP, has access to the information sought by the government, mere
access does not diminish one's reasonable expectation of privacy
because "there is a societal expectation that the ISP or phone company
will not do so as a matter of course."'' 0 4 The Court would not permit
the government to "bootstrap" the intermediary's limited access to the
subscriber information (in this case the IP address or, in Katz, the
phone number) to allow it to access the content of the communication
99 Id. at 467-68.
'
0 Id. at 475.
"'
1 Id. at 470-71.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 470.
"°Id. at 471.
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(the content of an e-mail or the substance of a telephone
conversation).10 5
Second, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the ISP's ability to scan for
child pornography and viruses was insufficient to waive the
expectation of privacy in the e-mail's content. 10 6 The Court reasoned
that scanning an e-mail for particular terms, images or similar indicia
of wrongdoing would not disclose the substance of the e-mail because,
like the post office, which screens packages for drugs and explosives,
neither the content of the package nor the content of the e-mail is
revealed. 10
7
Third, the Sixth Circuit examined Warshak's facial challenge to
the applicable portion of the SCA.'0° Although a facial challenge to a
legislative act is "the most difficult challenge to mount" because "the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exist under
which the Act would be valid," the Sixth Circuit held that Warshak
satisfied this burden.' 0 9 The Court reasoned that when the government
seizes an e-mail from an ISP without a warrant supported by probable
cause, without "notice to the account holder to render the intrusion the
functional equivalent of a subpoena," or without even a showing that
the user waived the expectation of privacy or did not maintain one,
then no set of circumstances exists for which § 2703 of the SCA would
be valid. 1"0 The Court held the narrow, facial invalidation of the SCA
was justified.'11
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ultimately
held that when a user does not expect a third party to access one's e-
mail in the normal course of business, "the party maintains a
reasonable expectation of privacy, and subpoenaing the entity with
mere custody over the documents is insufficient to trump the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement." 112 On remand, the Court permitted
1o5,ld.
l°6Id. at 474.
107 id.
'0' Id. at 476.
"9 Id. at 477.
110 Id.
... Id. at 479.
121d. at 475.
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the government to seize private e-mails in electronic storage under the
following circumstances: (1) by obtaining a search warrant under the
Fourth Amendment; (2) by providing notice to the account holder
when seeking a court order; or (3) by showing specific, articulable
facts, demonstrating that the ISP or other entity has complete access to
the e-mails in the normal course of its business, which demonstrates
that the user has waived any expectation of privacy. 114
In July 2007, the United States petitioned for rehearing en banc. 1
Three nonprofit organizations and three law professors filed amicus
curiae briefs, but the Sixth Circuit refused to consider any amicus
briefs. 15 These briefs evince the current debate surrounding this issue
and the main arguments can be organized into two main camps.
On one hand, proponents such as Professor Peter Swire argue that
the courts should determine the outer limits of government
surveillance. Professor Swire argues that courts should define how the
Fourth Amendment applies to new technologies, because not only is
this the courts' proper role in government, but also judicial
determinations have influenced subsequent legislation in many
positive ways. 116 Professor Swire advocates for a "searching,
substantive inquiry into whether a search violates a person's
'reasonable expectation of privacy.'17
Should courts undertake this searching inquiry, proponents like
Professors Susan Freiwald, Patricia Bellia and Deirdre Mulligan argue
that courts would extend the Fourth Amendment's protection to one's
personal e-mail, because users maintain a reasonable expectation of
privacy in their personal e-mails, regardless of whether they are in
"
3 Id. at 475-76.
1 14 Brief of Respondent-Appellant, Warshak, 490 F.3d 455; see also Brief of Plaintiff-
Appellee, Warshak, 490 F.3d 455.
115 Posting by Orin Kerr to Volokh Conspiracy blog, http://www.volokb.com/posts.html
(September 7, 2007, 14:44 EST); see Brief for Steven Warshak-Patricia L. Bellia & Susan
Freiwald as Amici Curiae Supporting Petioner-Appellee, Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d
455, No. 06-4092 (6th Cir. 2007); Brief for Steven Warshak-Kevin S. Bankston et. al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner-Appellee, Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, No.
06-4092 (6th Cir. 2007); Brief for the United States-Orin S. Kerr as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent-Appellant, Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, No. 06-4092 (6th Cir. 2007).
116 Swire, supra note 17, at 922.
7Id. at 931.
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transmission, have already been accessed, or are in storage. 1 8 These
advocates argue that an e-mail user maintains a subjective expectation
of privacy in an e-mail so long as the user does not expose it to the
public.l" In addition, society objectively recognizes that e-mails are
private because of their widespread use. Individuals use e-mail for a
host of reasons, and in some instances, e-mail may be more revealing
than a telephone call because the historical exchange of e-mail can
reveal multiple exchanges over time whereas a phone conversation
only reveals information discrete to that exchange. 12 0  There is no
doubt that
[o]ne who looks at our e-mails obtains a detailed view into
our innermost thoughts; no previous mode of surveillance
exposes more. When we compose private and professional e-
mails, embed links to Internet sites in some, and attach
documents, pictures, sound files and videos to others, we
rely on the privacy of the medium.1 21
Proponents object to applying the third party doctrine in this
instance because the user is not the one revealing its personal
information to the world; rather, by the very nature of the service, the
third party ISP has access to the e-mails which does not in any way
eliminate one's expectation of privacy. In this instance, the ISP is a
holding container that merely has access to the e-mails by transmitting
them and later holding them in storage. But, proponents argue, the
relationship between the user and the ISP in no way enables the
government to step in and access the user's personal e-mail.1
2 2
Proponents argue that personal e-mails are entitled to the Fourth
Amendment's protection and that the government is therefore bound
by the warrant requirement. The Professors point out that "any other
result would be destructive of society's ability to communicate.'
' 23
118 Brief for Steven Warshak-Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, supra note 115, at 3; see
Mulligan, supra note 5, at 1592.
119 Brief for Steven Warshak-Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, supra note 115, at 4.
20 Id. at 5-6.
121 Id. at 10-15; see Mulligan, supra note 5, at 1594-96.
122 Brief for Steven Warshak-Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, supra note 115, at 10-15;
see Mulligan, supra note 5, at 1594-96.
123 Brief for Steven Warshak-Patricia L. Bellia & Susan Freiwald, supra note 115, at 6.
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Opponents like Professor Orin Kerr argue that the legislature, not
the courts, should determine privacy rights in the face of rapidly
changing technology.124  Professor Kerr suggests that technology
continues to change, and quickly; Kerr argues that "[w]hat counts as a
'reasonable expectation of privacy' is very much up for grabs" because
"no one knows whether an expectation of privacy in a new technology
is 'reasonable.' 125 The argument then goes that instead of relying on
a dynamic interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, the right to
privacy should be defined by Congress via statute. 126
Professor Kerr makes three arguments regarding why Congress,
rather than the courts, should determine the scope of the right to
privacy in electronic communications. First, Kerr points to the fact
that courts only settle matters regarding disputes that have occurred in
the past; this backward looking inquiry only enables courts to decide
matters regarding technologies that have long been introduced. 
127
Second, Kerr points out that courts are bound by stare decisis,
which limits the judiciary's ability to change legal principles quickly
in response to societal changes. 12  In contrast, the legislature enjoys
broad discretion to enact new statutes or update legislation by
amendment. 129 Third, Professor Kerr argues that courts have limited
information before them when deciding a case, and based on this
limited information, judges lack the expertise or precision to respond
to novel and complicated issues surrounding modem technology. 1 In
contrast, Congress has access to a wide range of inputs, which enables
it to gain a comprehensive understanding of the technological facts. 
131
Professor Kerr acknowledges that he is primarily concerned with
institutional incompetence when it comes to quickly changing
technology, and Kerr advocates for judicial caution in the face of a
rapidly changing environment.
124 See generally Kerr, supra note 17.
125 Kerr, supra note 17, at 808.
12 61 d. at 853.
12 71 d. at 868.
121 Id. at 871.
129 id.
13o Id. at 875.
131 id.
WRIGIHT2007-08]



